Colonial Fences Make Contentious Neighbors: Policy, Law, and Climate Refugees in India by Blue, Abigail
Hastings Environmental Law Journal
Volume 24 | Number 2 Article 9
1-1-2018
Colonial Fences Make Contentious Neighbors:
Policy, Law, and Climate Refugees in India
Abigail Blue
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_environmental_law_journal
Part of the Environmental Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Environmental Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation








Colonial Fences Make Contentious Neighbors:  
Policy, Law, and Climate Refugees in India 
by Abigail Blue 
 
Background 
Climate change poses a significant threat to the socioeconomic stability and 
population health of India and the countries that border it.  Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
Bhutan, southern Nepal, Myanmar (Burma), and northern territories in the 
Himalayan mountain range are experiencing increasingly frequent and severe 
climate events.1  Glacial floods have become a regular occurrence in the Himalayan 
region with varying degrees of socioeconomic impact, ranging from the moderate 
effects of lowered water quality and increased vector-borne disease to extreme 
impacts, such as the destruction of  villages, agricultural lands, roads, bridges, 
hydropower, human lives, and property.  With 15,000 glaciers and 9,000 glacial 
lakes, the Himalayan mountain range—which stretches 2,500 km across Bhutan, 
Nepal, Pakistan, India, and China—feeds nine perennial river systems in the region 
and constitutes a lifeline for nearly 1.5 billion people downstream.2  In the absence 
of adequate national response systems and resources to mitigate the impacts of 
climate events in the Himalayan region, environmental disasters and slow-onset 
climate impacts on agriculture and livability create push factors that prompt large-
scale migration, both within countries of origin as well as cross-boundary 
migration.3  The Indian Law Commission is struggling to enforce the admittedly 
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deficient laws that govern in-migration; India’s border control policies and 
practices ineffectively curb, let alone adequately manage, current immigration.4  In 
the absence of international, national, or regional-level legal and policy 
frameworks to manage migration, India is likely to experience a substantial 
increase in the unplanned immigration of climate migrants.  This will perpetuate 
the preexisting high levels of environmental risk, as well as the concomitant burden 
of social exclusion and limited access to basic resources and governmental aid. 
Substantial deficiencies remain in the interdisciplinary study of climate 
change, development and adaptation planning, climate-induced migration, and 
population health.  National and international governmental bodies, NGOs, and 
researchers alike tend to collect, analyze, and model data in disciplinary silos and 
focus on development, economics, the environment, and social or humanitarian 
services separately.5  These spheres of study encompass interdependent factors that 
influence the need to migrate, both internally within a country and across borders, 
in response to climate change and high-intensity weather events.  Climate migrants 
are not currently recognized by international policy frameworks as “refugees” and 
thus do not qualify for legal protections or humanitarian aid.6  This lack of legal 
designation further marginalizes climate migrants and results in substantial vacuity 
of data on these populations.  Nation-states worldwide have neglected to integrate 
internal and cross-boundary migration as an important element in disaster risk 
reduction, climate change adaptation plans, and socioeconomic development. 
A lack of both qualitative and quantitative “causality” between climate 
events and migration is commonly cited as a fundamental reason for excluding 
climate-induced migration from policy frameworks and legal protection.7  
Humanitarian aid organizations and NGOs that provide short-term disaster relief 
lack the capacity to adequately document immediate and long-term data on 
migrating populations.  Moreover, recording accurate data on these populations is 
difficult at best.  Climate migrants may cross international borders illegally, and 
they are generally marginalized and impoverished populations in host countries.  
Consequently, migrant populations are at a heightened risk for vulnerability, social 
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climate events is likely to compound issues in receiving “host” countries that suffer 
from already high rates of poverty, vector-borne disease, socioeconomic 
stratification, inadequate infrastructure, and low governance.  Climate migrants, or 
“climate refugees,” are among the most vulnerable populations in these scenarios. 
 
II. International Migration Policies and Legal Framework 
Analysis 
 
The international legal status of people forced to leave their homes due to the 
direct or indirect impacts of climate change—and are then internally displaced or 
have to cross international boundaries—is a matter of great debate.  Currently, 
competing definitions of this phenomenon preclude designation of climate 
migrants as “refugees” in international law, excluding them from the protection of 
international human rights regulations under the Geneva Convention of 1951.8  
This lack of agreement on refugee qualification in international government 
remains the primary obstacle to collateral policy strategies.  The distinction 
between forced and voluntary migration is relatively straightforward in the case of 
extreme environmental events, such as storm and flood disasters.  Yet, there 
remains a substantial lack of empirical data that illustrates the complex causal 
relationship between climate change and migration.  As a result, this distinction is 
hard to establish in cases where gradual environmental degradation and climate 
related, slow-onset events are assumed to drive people to abandon their homes.  
Examination of some of the prevalent definitions proposed by leading experts in 
the field is provided below. 
The United Nations Environmental Programme sought to define 
“environmental refugees” as: “[P]eople who have been forced to leave their 
traditional habitat, temporarily or permanently, because of a marked environmental 
disruption (natural and/or triggered by people) that jeopardized their existence 
and/or seriously affected the quality of their life.”9  This definition has been 
repeatedly rejected, inter alia, by the United Nations High Commissioner on 
Refugees and the International Organization for Migration.  These organizations 
have since adopted the less controversial category of “environmentally displaced 
persons,” defined as: “[P]ersons who are displaced within their own country of 
habitual residence or who have crossed an international border and for whom 
environmental degradation, deterioration or destruction is a major cause of their 
displacement, although not necessarily the sole one.”10   
 
8. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status 
of Refugees, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 (July 1951), http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/3b66c2aa10 
[https://perma.cc/WTZ4-77QJ]. 
9. W. Franklin & G. Cardy, United Nations Envt Program, Environment and Forced 
Migration: A Review, 2, (Jan. 1998) (on file with author). 
10. Steffen Bauer, “Climate Refugees” Beyond Copenhagen:  Legal Concept, 








Legal scholars and human rights activists argue against using the term 
“refugee” for three reasons: 1) the requirement to establish a robust and exclusive 
causal link between specific environmental change and a person’s decision to 
migrate in order to qualify as a refugee; 2) the specific guarantees granted to 
refugees proper by the Geneva Convention, specifically those relating to the Status 
of Refugees of 1951 (and its Protocol of 1967); and 3) the lack of basis in 
considering empirical phenomena, such as climate change or environmental 
degradation, as agents of persecution.11 
There are a number of legally binding international laws that may be 
amended or expanded to encompass climate migrants.  One approach is the 
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers 
and Members of Their Families, which the UN General Assembly ratified in 
1990.12  While it explicitly addresses labor migration, its legal provision might 
apply in a wider context.  However, the convention enjoys limited international 
support and has hardly been a success story so far.  To go into effect, the convention 
required ratification by twenty member states, a process that took more than 
thirteen years, and today it only has thirty-nine signatories out of fifty-one member 
States.13  Moreover, its regulations are rarely observed.14 
The United Nations developed the “Responsibility to Protect” to prevent 
failures of inaction, which it employs as an innovative approach to address an 
apparent operational protection gap in international law.  It was developed to 
reaffirm the UN’s high moral authority for the universal protection of human 
rights, in response to the tragedies in the 1990s Rwanda and the Balkans.15  
Ultimately, this principle aspires to make it incumbent on states to take appropriate 
protective measures during events that imperil human rights.16  This stopgap 
 
11. International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers 
and Members of Their Families 30 I.L.M. 1517 (Dec. 1990), http://www.ohchr.org/ 
Documents/ProfessionalInterest/cmw.pdf [https://perma.cc/D2SV-LV98].  
12. Id. 
13. International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers 
and Members of Their Families, Status of Ratification and Signatories, (last visited Apr. 6, 
2018), https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-13&chap 
ter=4&lang=en [https://perma.cc/3DUK-LPK6]. 
14. Steffen Bauer, “Climate Refugees” Beyond Copenhagen:  Legal Concept, 
Political Implications, Normative Considerations, GERMAN DEV. INST. at 3, (Mar. 2010), 
https://www.brot-fuer-die-welt.de/fileadmin/mediapool/2_Downloads/Fachinformationen/ 
Analyse/analyse_12_englisch_climate_refugees.pdf [https://perma.cc/7MNK-KQYG]. 
15. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (Dec. 2001), http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20 
Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/E3W5-RG7U], see also OUTREACH PROGRAMME ON THE 
RWANDA GENOCIDE AND THE UNITED NATIONS, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: 
BACKGROUND NOTE (Mar. 2002), http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/pdf/Bgre 
sponsibility.pdf [https://perma.cc/DF7X-STJ8]. 
16. Steffen Bauer, “Climate Refugees” Beyond Copenhagen: Legal Concept, 








measure may be utilized as a temporary means of addressing the human rights of 
climate migrants. 
The United Nations’ Convention to Combat Desertification in Countries 
Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, established particularly to 
address climate challenges in Africa, explicitly acknowledges the link between 
environmental degradation and migration.17  Article 17.1(e) specifically requests 
governments to account for “the relationship between poverty, migration caused 
by environmental factors, and desertification.”18  It has been proposed that climate 
induced migration may be aptly addressed under this convention. 
While climate migrants have remained a fringe issue in international climate 
negotiations, legal frameworks for ensuring the protection of climate migrants’ 
human rights are receiving increasing attention.  In 2009, the UNHCR published 
recommendations to the UNFCCC Conference of Parties suggesting that, “while 
there is no mono-causal relationship between climate change and displacement” 
States Parties should “acknowledge that there is a clear link between the effects of 
climate change and displacement,” and further, that “States Parties should build on 
existing international response mechanisms to ensure policy coherence between 
mitigation, adaptation, humanitarian responses and development”.19  Though this 
indicated acknowledgement of the issue, it did nothing to address it through legal 
means.  
More recently, with the United Nations resolution to appoint the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM) as an official “related 
organization” of the U.N. in 2016,20 new recommendations for legal frameworks 
are emerging.  In a recent draft article on the protection of persons in the event of 
disasters, published by the U.N., the IOM, along with the Norwegian Refugee 
Council, seem to recommend a scatter shot approach to legal reforms; wherein they 
reframe current definitions and revise established agreements to more broadly 
encompass environmentally displaced migrants as a protected class within existing 
 
17. U.N. Convention to Combat Desertification in those Countries Experiencing 
Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa, Paris, (Oct. 14, 1994), 1954 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter U.N. Convention on Desertification], https://treaties.un.org/ 
doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20II/Chapter%20XXVII/XXVII-10.en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JJ66-KSD9]. 
18. Michelle Leighton, Thomas R. Loster, & Koko Warner, Global Trends: The 
Challenges of Climigration, D+C DEV. & COOPERATION (Aug. 28, 2009), 
https://www.dandc.eu/en/article/climate-change-will-trigger-mass-migration 
[https://perma.cc/6CSB-6BYD]. 
19. U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, FORCED DISPLACEMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF 




20. International Organization for Migration, Press Release, IOM Becomes a Related 
Organization to the UN (July 25, 2016), https://www.iom.int/news/iom-becomes-related-
organization-un [https://perma.cc/J5YS-3NVG]. 
  




legal agreements. 21  Through the lens of disaster risk reduction and the use of 
foreign military and civil defense assets in disaster relief, also referred to as the 
“Oslo Guidelines,” IOM is redefining the terms of the legal agreements by which 
nation states take actionable measures in disaster relief, to more acutely address 
climate refugees’ rights to “essential needs.”22  How these revisions translate in 
implementation on the ground is yet to be seen. Moreover, climate migrants still 
lack a comprehensive framework for legal protection.  And, especially in 
protracted resettlement without enforceable rights, climate migrants remain 
marginalized and vulnerable.  
 




India has contended with colonial occupation and empirical influence since 
the early 1400s.  The Portuguese (1434-1961), Dutch (1605-1825), Danes (1620-
1869), French (1769-1854), and British (1612-1947) all impacted India’s present 
day national boundaries, demographics, cultural milieu, and legal systems.23  
Under English occupation, the nation-states of Pakistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, 
Southern Nepal, Myanmar (Burma), and northern territories surrounding Jammu 
and Kashmir in the Himalayan Mountain Range were considered part of India.  In 
its Report on the Proposed Foreigners Amendment Bill of 2000, the Law 
Commission recounts the historical relationships between India, Pakistan (while 
under formation), and East Pakistan (later to become Bangladesh), beginning with 
the British occupation of India. 
The British needed cheap labour for their plantations and industrial 
establishments not only in India but in other parts of the world under their political 
authority.  This they ensured through inter-country and intra-country migration of 
labour.  It is on record that since 1920, they moved people to serve as labourers 
from the eastern region of Bengal to Assam for developing their tea industries.  
Later, the political divide of the people on the basis of religion which ultimately 
led to the Partition of the country resulted in the largest ever migratory movement 
in the world’s history.  India had to absorb the bulk of the migrants.24 
In the months preceding Indian Independence, the British began 
implementing the “Mountbatten Plan” of Partition to divide India along religious 
lines.  Pakistan was formed as a Muslim state and recognized as independent on 
August 14, 1947; at a time when Bangladesh was considered part of East Pakistan.  
India was recognized as independent on August 15, 1947, subsequently displacing 
 
21. International Law Commission, Draft articles on the protection of persons in the 
event of disasters, art. 2 (2016), http://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../ilc/texts/instruments/ 
english/commentaries/6_3_2016.pdf&lang=EF [https://perma.cc/TPX3-YFUF]. 
22. Id. 
23. BARBARA D. METCALF & THOMAS R. METCALF, A CONCISE HISTORY OF MODERN 
INDIA 221-22 (Cambridge Univ. Press ed., 2nd ed. 2006). 
24. Rep. on the Proposed Foreigners (Amendment) Bill, 2000, supra note 4, at 3. 
  




nearly 12.5 million people and leading to an estimated death toll “varying from 
several hundred thousand to a million.”25 
The violent nature of the partition created an atmosphere of mutual hostility 
and suspicion between India and neighboring Pakistan and Bangladesh that afflicts 
their relationships to this day. 
An estimated 25 million Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs (1947–present) crossed 
the newly drawn borders to reach their new homelands.  These estimates are based 
on comparisons of censuses from 1941 and 1951 with adjustments for normal 
population growth in the areas of migration.  In northern India—undivided Punjab 
and North Western Frontier Province (NWFP)—nearly 12 million were forced to 
move from as early as March 1947 following the Rawalpindi violence.26, 27 
The historical context of forced migration and colonial division of nation-
states significantly impacts present day migrants’ reception, integration, and social 
inclusion or exclusion in receiving communities.  While Nepalese and Tibetan 
Chinese are generally regarded as benevolent neighbors, Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi immigrants are met with ardent discrimination in receiving 
communities, both socially and via the policies governing immigration. 
The Ministry of Home Land Affairs and the Law Commission of the 
Ministry of Law and Justice for the Central Government of India recognized these 
historical relationships and the long-term trends of migration caused by political 
events within and between neighboring countries in the years following 
Independence. 
Partition was not the only event that resulted in large scale migration of 
populations.  Even after the formation of Bangladesh in 1971, the migration of 
people from the new State continued to the bordering states of India.  Infiltration 
also took place in 1948 from across the border into Jammu and Kashmir following 
the armed attack by Pakistan in the guise of “raiders.”  The developments in Tibet; 
insurgency in Sri Lanka resulting in migration of large numbers of Sri Lankan 
Tamils to Tamil Nadu; the coming of many Afghans to India after takeover of 
Afghanistan by Taliban, and recently the infiltration into Kargil . . . in varying 
degrees, have been responsible for entry into India of foreigners as refugees and 
illegal migrants.28 
 
India’s International Migration Profile 
 
Policy and Law Review 
 
The current law governing migration, citizenship, national identity 
determination, deportation, and internment of foreigners in India is the Foreigners 
 
25. METCALF & METCALF, supra note 23. 
26. RAVINDER KAUR, SINCE 1947: PARTITION NARRATIVES AMONG PUNJABI 
MIGRANTS OF DELHI (Oxford Univ. Press. ed., 2007). 
27. Census of India, 1941, CENSUS COMMISSIONER, DELHI, MANAGER GOVT. OF 
INDIA PRESS SIMLA. 
28. Rep. on the Foreigners (Amendment) Bill, 2000, supra note 4, at 4. 
  




Amendment Bill of 2000.  This law was preceded by the Passport Act of 1920, the 
Registration of Foreigners Act of 1939, the Foreigners Act of 1946, the Immigrants 
(expulsion from Assam) Act of 1950, and the Illegal Migrants (Determination by 
Tribunals) Act of 1983—all enacted specifically to control the unabated influx of 
illegal migrants to the North-Eastern region.29  The current law, proposed in 1998 
and passed by the Sixteenth Law Commission in 2000, was established under the 
Law Commission of India, Ministry of Law and Justice.  Prior to the law’s passage, 
the Indian Central Government’s Committee on Home Affairs “felt that the 
Government should undertake an in-depth study regarding the efficacy of the 
proposed amendments in checking infiltration of foreigners from across the 
borders.”30  The report revealed the most accurate migration statistics available 
from 2000 to present on migrant populations; reflected the cultural perception of 
migrants from various neighboring countries (specifically Pakistan and 
Bangladesh); and codified into law the policies, practices and procedures now in-
force regarding foreign immigration, detainment, internment, and deportation. 
The Central Government of India has attempted to curb illegal immigration 
(primarily from Bangladesh) through laws such as the Assam Accord, which 
intended to drive Bangladeshis out of the border-states of Assam, Nagaland, 
Mizoram, Tripura, Meghalaya, and West Bengal.  The current law, the Foreigners 
Amendment Bill, recommended the use of “border fencing, modernized electronic 
surveillance systems as well as an effective legislation to deal with the menace.”31  
However, these administrative measures were found to be ineffective and cost 
prohibitive.  The Central Government has provided millions of rupees to the state 
governments (specifically Assam) to support the identification and deportation of 
Bangladeshis and have taken measures to strengthen Border Security Force 
through the construction of border roads, fencing and mechanized riverine 
patrolling.  However, migration levels remain unchanged and deportation efforts 
are largely unsuccessful.32 
 
Statistical Information on Migration  
 
In the Report on the Proposed Foreigners Amendment Bill of 2000, the Law 
Commission identifies the challenges facing the Central Government of India in 
managing or lowering incidents of in-migration to India from neighboring nation-
states (specifically Bangladesh).33  The Report cites the scale, regional distribution, 
identity, causes, border corruption and economic inefficiency of current migration 
 
29. Id. at 20. 
30. Id. at 1. 
31. Id. at 8. 
32. Id. at 4. 
33. Rep. on the Foreigners (Amendment) Bill, 2000, No. 175, LAW COMM’N OF INDIA 
at 8, http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/reports/175thReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZQZ4-
PQ9W]. 
  




management in several sections.34  To illustrate the Central Government’s 
statistical analysis of migration, an excerpt from this report is included herein: 
[3.2] Since the liberation of erstwhile East Pakistan, the influx of migrants 
from Bangladesh has remained unabated and has acquired frightening proportions. 
There is no realistic estimate of these migrants in India. In fact, no census has been 
carried out to determine their number. According to the Ministry of Home Affairs, 
the total number of Bangladeshis illegally residing in India is estimated at 15 to 18 
million and every year at least 3.5 lac (300,500) or more people are infiltrating into 
the country.35 
 
III.  India’s Climate Change Risk Exposure and Internal 
Migration Trends 
 
In 2007, South Asia experienced a series of floods in India, Nepal, Bhutan, 
Pakistan and Bangladesh.  Several news agencies, citing the Indian and 
Bangladeshi governments, estimated that the floods displaced more than 14 million 
people.36  By August 3rd, approximately 20 million were displaced, and by August 
10th, some 30 million people in India, Bangladesh and Nepal were affected by the 
flooding.37  As climatic stresses force resettlement and migration within India, 
neighboring countries that suffer similar weather events but with less 
infrastructure, governance and adaptation, are showing trends of migration similar 
to India.  Moreover, extreme flooding and increasingly frequent climatic events in 
this region further impede recovery efforts and the rebuilding of critical 
infrastructure necessary for economic stability and human health.  In 2010, 
devastating floods caused the largest displacement in Pakistan’s history, with as 
many as 11 million people forced to relocate.38  In 2012, it was estimated that at 
least 6 million people were displaced by the effects of climate hazards in 
Bangladesh.39  In 2017, United Nations humanitarian agencies were working with 
the Nepalese government and partners to bring in clean water, food, shelter and 
medical aid for some of the 41 million people affected by flooding and landslides 
 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 5–6. 
36. Hong Kong Red Cross, South Asia Flood 2007: Work Report, RELIEFWEB (Oct. 
20, 2008), https://reliefweb.int/report/bangladesh/south-asia-flood-2007-work-report 
[https://perma.cc/44RX-5JR6]. 
37. United Nations Children’s Fund [UNICEF], Millions of People Across South 
Asia Affected by Monsoonal Flooding (Aug. 3, 2007), http://www.unicef.org/media/ 
media_40495.html [https://perma.cc/9JW3-KWH9]. 
38. Norwegian Refugee Counsel, Briefing paper on flood-displaced women in Sindh 
Province, Pakistan, RELIEFWEB (June 2011), 3, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/ 
files/resources/F_R_88.pdf [https://perma.cc/J49S-3YDY]. 
39. UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, Displacement Solutions, 
Climate Displacement in Bangladesh The Need for Urgent Housing, Land and Property 








in South Asia.40  These figures underscore the need for a legal framework for 
persons displaced by climate disasters.  India continues to grant asylum and 
provide direct assistance to some 200,000 refugees from neighboring countries.  In 
the absence of a national legal framework for asylum, UNHCR undertakes refugee 
status determination and assists nearly 22,000 urban refugees and asylum-
seekers.41  This is clearly an inadequate response given the magnitude of persons 
displaced by frequent climate events.  Further, little is known about the longer-
term capacity of receiving countries to accommodate larger numbers of 
(environmentally forced or motivated) migrants.42 
Over the next forty years, India will experience one of the most dramatic 
settlement transitions in history as its urban population grows from about 300 
million to more than 700 million.43  By 2025, an estimated seventy cities in India 
are expected to reach populations exceeding one million.44  Three mega-urban 
regions, Mumbai (50 million), the national capital region of Delhi (more than 30 
million), and Kolkata (20 million) will be among the largest concentrated urban 
areas in the world.45  By mid-century, India could have both the largest urban and 
rural population of all time.46  This will have a substantial impact on global climate 
vulnerability and the potential for mitigation and adaptation.47  Although India’s 
agricultural sector contributes only eighteen percent to the country’s GDP, it 
provides livelihoods to almost sixty percent of the population, and the biomass and 
ecosystem services that enable the “metabolism” of most Indian cities to 
function.48  The relative importance of environmental factors (and impacts on the 
agricultural sector) in livelihoods helps determine how important the environment 
 
40. UN agencies aid millions affected by flooding, landslides in South Asia, UN 
NEWS (Aug. 24, 2017), https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/08/563762-un-agencies-aid-
millions-affected-flooding-landslides-south-asia [https://perma.cc/J75J-MS7B]. 
41. Id. 
42. Koko Warner, Assessing Institutional and Governance Needs Related to 
Environmental Change and Human Migration, THE GERMAN MARSHALL FUND OF THE 
UNITED STATES at 4, 8 (June 2010), http://archive.unu.edu/africa/activities/files/Warner_ 
K_2010_Assessing_Institutional_and_Governance_Needs_Related_to_Environmental_Ch
ange.pdf [https://perma.cc/9T6Y-U269]. 
43. Aromar Revi, Long-range Macro-dynamics of Indian Urbanization in a 
Globalizing World, Proceedings of the Conference on Indian and China in a Global 
Perspective, New School, New York (April 2006). 
44. BARRY B. HUGHES & EVAN E. HILLEBRAND, EXPLORING AND SHAPING 
INTERNATIONAL FUTURES 209 (Taylor & Francis, 2006). 
45. TIM DYSON & PRAVIN VISARIA, Migration and Urbanization: Retrospect & 
Prospect, in TWENTY FIRST CENTURY INDIA: POPULATION, ECONOMY, HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT 108–57 (Oxford U. Press, 1st ed. 2004). 
46. Aromar Revi, Climate Change Risk: adaptation and mitigation agenda for 









is when migration decisions are made.49  Increased climate-related stress on the 
agricultural sector due to both drought and flooding may prompt increased rural-
urban migration while also contributing to food and water scarcity in urban centers. 
India is one of the most vulnerable and risk-prone countries in the world.50  
Climate change is expected to increase the frequency and intensity of current 
hazards and the probability of extreme weather events, as well as spur the 
emergence of new hazards (e.g., sea-level rise), and create new vulnerabilities with 
differential spatial and socioeconomic impacts.51  This will further degrade the 
resilience of poor and vulnerable communities that make up about one quarter to 
one half of the population of most Indian cities.52  Severe stresses induced in urban 
areas due to a mix of water scarcity, the breakdown of environmental services, 
flooding, and consequent water-borne diseases, and malaria-type epidemics 
combined with a rapid rise in health expenditure could maintain the low current 
level of rural-urban migration.  The potential for climate change (along with other 
driving factors) to induce internal migration and urbanization within India is high.  
There is little comprehensive research on the associative relationships between 
slow-onset climactic change, agricultural degradation, and rural-urban migration 
in India.  However, data on the declining systemic health of the agricultural sector 
and increased water scarcity (inevitably exacerbated by declining snow melt from 
the Himalayas) in both rural and urban areas of India suggests an overall increase 
in the vulnerability to human systems.  The likelihood of increased floods, food 
shortages, water scarcity and increased vector-borne diseases in low elevation 
urban centers—will adversely affect both rural and urban “metabolism,” and may 
even prompt urban-rural migration within India.  However, populations in 
neighboring countries that suffer from less structural resilience may migrate to 
India in search of more advanced infrastructure and support. 
A multitude of socioeconomic and environmental indicators suggest 
significant correlations between climate change and both rural-urban migration and 
cross-boundary migration to urban coastal zones in India.  High-intensity climate 
disasters, and long-term slow onset climate degradation in India—and in 
neighboring countries such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and the 
Maldives—are likely to increase migration to urban cities in low-elevation coastal 
zones.53  Migrant populations and internally displaced people will face increased 
vulnerability to the socioeconomic and health impacts of climate-induced 
migration, and suffer from reduced access to basic needs and services.  
International governments and India’s domestic laws neglect to account for the role 
climate change plays in migration to urban centers, and lack the comprehensive 
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frameworks needed for climate change adaptation measures in high-density urban 
coastal zones. 
 
IV. Climate Change, Vulnerable Populations and International 
Conflict 
 
While much of the research conducted in the fields of human migration, 
environmental climate change, development, economics, and human health has 
been done through a narrow disciplinary lens, a common vulnerability unites the 
impoverished and displaced in countries of South Asia.  This excerpt from Revi’s 
Climate Change Risk aptly summarizes the commonality: 
 
Having limited skills, education, capital and access to the social 
networks that underpin much of economic and social mobility, in urban 
India, more of the landless and small and marginal farmers are forced 
to migrate, often forming the most vulnerable groups in cities. They 
often live in illegal, unserviced settlements exposed to a wide range of 
environmental risks from flooding to fire, and continual cycles of 
demotion and eviction by civil authorities. They are, therefore, dual 
victims of existing natural hazards and emerging climate change—
displaced from their original places of residence and occupations, and 
challenged by urban risks in their new urban places of residence.54 
 
Trans-boundary climate migrants share a similar fate of dual exposure and 
continually diminished resilience. 
Changes in river hydrology, snow melt, and the subsequent decline of the 
agricultural sector (upon which the majority of subsistence farmers rely) will affect 
multiple countries whose urban and rural ecology is dependent on shared water 
resources.  The most serious regional impact of climate change will be the changes 
in river hydrology in the indo-Gangetic plain and the Brahmaputra valley, due to 
glacial melt and regression of the Himalayan glaciers.55  Ongoing trans-boundary 
conflicts between India and Pakistan, and Nepal, India and Bangladesh, could also 
be compounded by a possible China-India conflict over the use of Yarlung Tsang-
po/Brahmaputra water.56  Trans-boundary conflicts over scarce water resources are 
also likely to sharpen cultural divisions.  A case study by the Inventory of Conflict 
and Environment entitled “Climate Change and Conflict in Migration from 
Bangladesh to Assam (India)” articulates the historical trend of climate-induced 
migration and subsequent ethnic violence: 
Violent conflict in Assam between indigenous groups and Bangladeshi 
migrants began in 1979 when the presence of 70,000 immigrants was discovered 
in one constituency.  When the government did nothing to mitigate this influx of 
outsiders, the groups polarized and organized.  The result was at least 4,700 deaths 
 








that year.  From that point on, an unstable government has endured constant civil 
disobedience campaigns and excessive ethnic violence.  Support for radicalism 
increases with added strain on jobs and resources.  Government officials in India 
are wary of unrest and are actively trying to stem the influx of migrants and 
negotiate an end to overt violence.  Bangladeshi environmental refugees are 
searching for sustainable livelihoods in Assam, but the government fights 
migration, lacking effective mechanisms for integration with local communities.57 
The next most important climate change risk is increased riverine and inland 
flooding, particularly in northern and eastern India bordering Nepal and 
Bangladesh.58  There are tens of millions of people that are currently affected by 
floods for three to six months out of the year in eastern India.59  Climate change is 
expected to increase the severity of flooding in many Indian river basins, especially 
those in the Godavari and Mahanadi along the eastern coast.60  Floods are expected 
to increase in northwestern India, adjoining Pakistan, and in most coastal plains, in 
spite of existing upstream dams and “multi-purpose” projects.61  From climate 
science forecasting in the neighboring regions of Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, 
Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives, and the likelihood of increased climate 
induced out-migration, historical precedents imply that cultural conflict and ethnic 




Policy, law and governance play a crucial role in the social and economic 
outcomes for both migrant and receiving communities.  The cost of unplanned, 
unregulated migration to India from countries contending with frequent climate 
disaster is two-fold.  There is the financial cost as millions of Indian crore are being 
spent ineffectively to abate in-migration from Bangladesh and Pakistan, as well as 
the social cost from the lack of integration and increased likelihood of cultural 
tension and conflict.  Development, urban infrastructure and population health are 
also hindered by the lack of intergovernmental coordination in regard to migration.  
This creates added environmental stresses on urban centers (i.e., sanitation, 
pollution and access to potable water) and compromises population health as a 
whole. 
Increased governance and preemptive policies that address migration across 
borders strengthens formal trade relations, increases resilience among migrant 
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communities in regions of resettlement, reduces the likelihood of cultural conflict, 
and expands access to basic resources that increase over-all health outcomes.  
Increased coordination between the Indian Central Government, Bangladeshi, and 
Pakistani governments also has ancillary social and financial benefits for India and 
neighboring countries, and is a preferred policy strategy for addressing migration 
as an adaptation strategy to environmental change.  
State-level interventions that can reduce the impact of climate events and 
migration could include planned relocation, legal protection for displaced people, 
and structural measures in development to reduce the impacts of environmental 
change (such as flood defenses).  These policy interventions increase resilience in 
migrant and receiving communities, reduce the likelihood of endemic disease and 
vulnerability, and increase mitigation bio-regionally and in urban centers.  
Development, environment and cross-boundary migration policies—previously 
created in mutual exclusion—can be increasingly effective if objectives for climate 
adaptation were considered as a shared objective in future policy. 
Climate change and climate migration is one of the most significant threats 
to India’s socioeconomic stability and stability in the region.  India is the main 
recipient of population flow in South Asia, including both climate refugees and 
economic migrants, and new bilateral policies and de-colonized legal frameworks 
must take into consideration the historical context of national division to 
effectively create policy solutions in migration.  While India has preferred to tackle 
such issues internally, it may consider involving international actors in arriving at 
meaningful solutions because the reach and complexity of the international 
population movements are beyond the capacities of a single country.62  
Organizations that provide international aid, such as the United Nations High 
Commission on Refugees, and organizations like the International Organization on 
Migration that deals with complex multi-lateral migration policy issues and on-
the-ground implementation, could play a significant role in assisting India and 





62. Sanjeev Tripathi, Illegal Immigration From Bangladesh to India: Toward a 
Comprehensive Solution, CARNEGIE INDIA (June 29, 2016), http://carnegieindia.org/ 
2016/06/29/illegal-immigration-from-bangladesh-to-india-toward-comprehensive-
solution-pub-63931 [https://perma.cc/2UCD-7UYL]. 
